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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge. 
 
For several years now, the District Court and this Court 
have been adjudicating appellants' various challenges to the 
dissemination of sex offender notices in New Jersey under 
what has popularly become known as "Megan's Law." As to 
one of those challenges, and alone among the Courts of 
Appeals which have considered Megan's Law cases, we 
found that sex offender notices implicate a nontrivial 
privacy interest, albeit only with respect to one piece of 
information -- the home address of the offender. This 
litigation, however, now comes to an end, for we conclude 
that appellees have shown, in the words of our prior order 
of remand, that appellants' "interest in assuring that 
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information is disclosed only to those who have a particular 
need for it has been accorded adequate protection" by the 
Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for the 
Implementation of Sex Offender and Community 
Notification Laws (Mar. 2000) (the "New Guidelines"). Paul 
P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Paul P. I"). 




Megan's Law, so named for Megan Kanka, a little girl who 
was sexually abused and murdered by a twice-convicted 
sex offender, was enacted "to identify potential recidivists 
and alert the public when necessary for the public safety." 
E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1097 (3d Cir. 1997). Given 
that laudatory goal, therefore, this case begins with the 
understanding and, indeed, the requirement that what 
might otherwise be private information be made public. 
 
As we set forth in great detail in Artway v. Attorney 
General, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996), Megan's Law 
"requires all persons who complete a sentence for certain 
designated crimes involving sexual assault after Megan's 
Law was enacted to register with local law enforcement." Id. 
at 1243; see also N.J.S.A. S 2C:7-2."The registrant must 
provide the following information to the chief law 
enforcement officer of the municipality in which he [or she] 
resides: name, social security number, age, race, sex, date 
of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, address of legal 
residence, address of any current temporary legal 
residence, and date and place of employment." Artway, 81 
F.3d at 1243; see also N.J.S.A.S 2C:7-4b(1). Once the 
information is provided by the sex offender, it is forwarded 
"to the Division of State Police, which incorporates it into a 
central registry and notifies the prosecutor of the county in 
which the registrant plans to reside." Artway , 81 F.3d at 
1243. At this stage, the information is not yet available to 
the public. 
 
Once the information is received in the prosecutor's office 
of the county in which the registrant plans to reside, that 
office, in consultation with the prosecutor's office of the 
county in which the registrant was convicted, "determine[s] 
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whether the registrant poses a low, moderate, or high risk 
of reoffense. In making that determination, the prosecutor 
must consider the guidelines the Attorney General has 
promulgated pursuant to the Act." Id. at 1244 (citing 
N.J.S.A. SS 2C:7-8d(1), 2C:7-8a to b). The law mandates 
that 
 
       [e]very registrant at least qualif[y] for Tier 1 treatment, 
       otherwise known as `law enforcement alert,' where 
       notification extends only to law enforcement agencies 
       likely to encounter the registrant. N.J.S.A. S 2C:7-8c(1). 
       In the case of those registrants posing a moderate risk 
       of reoffense, Tier 2 notification, or `law enforcement, 
       school and community organization alert,' issues to 
       registered schools, day care centers, summer camps, 
       and other community organizations which care for 
       children or provide support to women and where 
       individuals are likely to encounter the sex offender. 
       N.J.S.A. S 2C:7-8c(2). The high risk registrants merit 
       Tier 3's `community notification,' where members of the 
       public likely to encounter the registrant are notified. 
       N.J.S.A. S 2C:7-8c(3). 
 
E.B., 119 F.3d at 1083. After a classification tier is 
determined, the prosecutor notifies the registrant of the 
proposed notification and he or she can then challenge the 
classification through a pre-notification judicial review 
process in state court. 
 
Appellants in this case "are Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants 
who have been certified as a class and whose offenses were 
committed after the enactment of Megan's Law." Paul P. I, 
170 F.3d at 399. On June 16, 1997, appellants filed a class 
action complaint against the Attorney General of New 
Jersey and all twenty-one county prosecutors (collectively, 
the "State defendants") alleging that Megan's Law violated 
their constitutional rights of privacy and due process, and 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. After thefiling 
of the complaint, however, this Court rejected most of the 
same claims in E.B. v. Verniero. See 119 F.3d at 1111. 
Pursuant to E.B., therefore, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to the State defendants on October 29, 
1997. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 982 F. Supp. 961, 962-963 
(D.N.J. 1997). With respect to the right to privacy claim, the 
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Court held that the information did not fall "within the 
`zones of privacy' protected under the Constitution." Id. at 
966. 
 
On appeal to this Court, appellants raised only one issue: 
whether the dissemination of notices under Megan's Law 
violates their constitutional right to privacy. See Paul P. I, 
170 F.3d at 399. Specifically, appellants "argue[d] that the 
statutory requirement that the class members provide 
extensive information to local law enforcement personnel, 
including each registrant's current biographical data, 
physical description, home address, place of employment, 
schooling, and a description and license plate number of 
the registrant's vehicle, and the subsequent community 
notification is a violation of their constitutionally protected 
right to privacy." Id. at 398. 
 
We rejected appellants' claim "[t]o the extent that . . . 
[the] alleged injury stems from the disclosure of their sex 
offender status, alone or in conjunction with other 
information." Id. at 403. We explained that "the District 
Court's opinion is in line with other cases in this court and 
elsewhere holding specifically that arrest records and 
related information are not protected by a right to privacy." 
Id. 
 
With respect to the disclosure of home addresses, 
however, we took a different position. As we explained: 
 
       The compilation of home addresses in widely available 
       telephone directories might suggest a consensus that 
       these addresses are not considered private were it not 
       for the fact that a significant number of persons, 
       ranging from public officials and performers to just 
       ordinary folk, choose to list their telephones privately, 
       because they regard their home addresses to be private 
       information. Indeed, their view is supported by 
       decisions holding that home addresses are entitled to 
       privacy under FOIA, which exempts from disclosure 
       personal files `the disclosure of which would constitute 
       a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.' 
 
Id. at 404 (quoting 5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(6)). We also noted that: 
 
       Plaintiffs' primary argument receives further support 
       from the New Jersey Supreme Court holding, relying on 
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       FOIA cases, that `[t]he fact that plaintiff's home address 
       may be publicly available' aside, privacy interests were 
       implicated by the disclosure of the home address along 
       with the other information. 
 
Id. (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 83 (1995)). From 
these cases, we concluded that there is a "general 
understanding that home addresses are entitled to some 
privacy protection, whether or not so required by a statute." 
Id. We were, therefore, "unwilling to hold that absent a 
statute, a person's home address is never entitled to 
privacy protection," and instead accepted appellants' claim 
"that there is some nontrivial interest in one's home 
address by persons who do not wish it disclosed." Id. 
 
Having accepted the argument that there was a privacy 
interest, we proceeded to determine whether the 
information was nonetheless subject to disclosure in light 
of a compelling governmental interest. See United States v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that an individual's privacy interest is not absolute 
and, therefore, can be curtailed by some governmental 
interests). Based on the governmental interest at stake in 
Megan's Law, we concluded that the privacy interest must 
give way: 
 
       The nature and significance of the state interest served 
       by Megan's Law was considered in E.B. There, we 
       stated that the state interest, which we characterized 
       as compelling, `would suffice to justify the deprivation 
       even if a fundamental right of the registrant's were 
       implicated.' E.B., 119 F.3d at 1104. Wefind no reason 
       to disagree. The public interest in knowing where prior 
       sex offenders live so that susceptible individuals can be 
       appropriately cautioned does not differ whether the 
       issue is the registrant's claim under the Double 
       Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses, or is the 
       registrant's claim to privacy. Thus, as the District 
       Court concluded, the plaintiffs' privacy claim based on 
       disclosure of information must fail. 
 
Paul P. I, 170 F.3d at 404. 
 
In reaching our conclusion, we declined to address 
appellants' "evidence of recent incidents which have caused 
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serious adverse consequences to" appellants and their 
families. Id. at 406 (noting that appellantsfiled several 
motions "seeking to supplement the record"). 1 We reasoned 
that in light of our holding, "the material [was] not relevant 
to a determination of the issue before us -- whether 
Megan's Law's notification provisions violate plaintiffs' 
constitutional right to privacy." Id. We recognized, however, 
that 
 
       this court has previously held that `[t]he fact that 
       protected information must be disclosed to a party who 
       has a particular need for it . . . does not strip the 
       information of its protection against disclosure to those 
       who have no similar need,' and we have required the 
       government to implement adequate safeguards against 
       unnecessary disclosure. 
 
Id. (quoting Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of 
Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 118 (3d Cir. 1987)). We, 
therefore, remanded the case to the District Court so that 
it could "consider whether plaintiffs' interest in assuring 
that information is disclosed only to those who have a 
particular need for it has been accorded adequate 
protection in light of the information set forth in the 
motions." Id. 
 
On remand, appellants raised the following challenges to 
the notification system: 
 
       (1) the Law lacks penalties to deter the unauthorized 
       disclosure of information; (2) there is no uniform 
       requirement that the registration process occur in a 
       setting which protects the registrant's privacy; (3) many 
       counties have inconsistent or unclear rules regarding 
       which school staff members are entitled to receive 
       information concerning Tier 2 offenders; (4) not all 
       counties deliver Tier 3 notices by hand to an 
       authorized adult; and (5) home addresses are included 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Those incidents, provided in the record for our review, include the 
loss 
of employment, forced eviction from residence, threats of physical harm, 
and gun shots being fired into a registrant's home following the 
unauthorized dissemination of notification fliers to the general public 
and the media. 
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       in all Tier 2 notices and are disclosed to all notice 
       recipients despite the fact that this information is not 
       needed by all recipients. 
 
Paul P. v. Farmer, 80 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322-23 (D.N.J. 
2000) (footnotes omitted). The State defendants countered, 
inter alia, by citing various sections of the then-in-place AG 
Guidelines "which caution against improper disclosure of 
Megan's Law information." Id. at 323. The District Court 
noted, however, that appellants had "summarized forty-five 
incidents where confidential information released under 
Megan's Law was distributed to unauthorized persons" as 
well as "provided many equally glaring examples where 
Megan's Law notices were publicly disseminated." Id. at 
324-25. The Court, therefore, rejected the State defendants' 
suggestion that the Court should "overlook any deficiencies 
in the current system in light of the compelling purposes 
served by the Act." Id. at 325. The Court explained that "the 
procedural safeguards contained within the Attorney 
General Guidelines are crucial to maintaining the 
constitutional balance between plaintiffs' privacy interests 
and the goals of the statute. If, in practice, these 
safeguards fail to limit the release of plaintiffs' home 
addresses to those persons with a statutorily defined need 
for this information, a different constitutional balance 
would result." Id. (citation omitted). The Court observed 
that 
 
       [a] system of distributing this information with zero 
       `leakage' to unauthorized persons is, in reality, 
       unattainable. However, the mandate for the Attorney 
       General is not to devise a perfect system, but one 
       calculated to achieve the goals of the statute without 
       unreasonably impinging on the `nontrivial' privacy 
       interests of the plaintiffs. The record before this Court 
       shows that the current system fails to meet this 
       standard. Currently, there is no uniform method of 
       distribution which ensures that, in all twenty-one 
       counties, Megan's Law notices will be distributed in a 
       manner reasonably calculated to get the information to 
       those with `a particular need for it' while avoiding 
       `disclosure to those who have no similar need.' 
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Id. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the Guidelines be 
redrafted. See id. 
 
Along with its Opinion of January 24, 2000, the District 
Court issued an Order "enjoining the enforcement of 
Megan's Law until the Attorney General promulgates 
Guidelines which comply with the holding of this Court." Id. 
at 326. The Court, however, "temporarily suspended the 
enforcement of this injunction pending appeal to and 
decision by the Third Circuit." Id. No appeal was pursued 
at that time. Instead, the parties entered into a consent 
order allowing the State defendants until March 23, 2000 to 
promulgate new guidelines. 
 
On March 23, 2000, the Attorney General issued the New 
Guidelines, certain discrete portions of which are the 
subject of this appeal. See App. at 76. As everyone, 
including appellants, agrees, the Attorney General has gone 
to great lengths in the New Guidelines toward ensuring 
uniform distribution of Megan's Law notices. 
 
The New Guidelines call for two types of notices to be 
prepared for each registrant: "[1] an Unredacted Notice, 
which includes all sex offender information without 
omission, and [2] a Redacted Notice, which omits the 
specific street number of the offender's home and the exact 
street address and business name of the offender's 
employer." Id. at 102. "The Redacted Notice may include the 
street name and block number or nearest cross-street of 
the offender's residence and workplace, but . . .[it] should 
not specify the exact street number or, if applicable, unit 
number of a multi-dwelling, apartment, building or other 
structure." Id. If the offender resides in "a motel or other 
residence which may be identified by name, the name may 
be disclosed [in a Redacted Notice] but the particular unit 
or room number should be omitted." Id. 
 
The New Guidelines mandate that only those individuals 
who are entitled to an Unredacted Notice and who sign a 
"receipt form" can receive the Unredacted Notice.2 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Briefly summarized, under the New Guidelines, when a registrant is 
classified as a Tier 2 offender, notices are "provided to school and 
community organization personnel so that they can take all appropriate 
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receipt form's language varies minimally depending on the 
recipient. See id. at 153-55. With respect to school 
principals and designated officials of community 
organizations, the recipient is informed "that the 
information in the notification form is to be treated as 
confidential and may be shared only with appropriate 
persons." App. at 153-54. By signing the form, the recipient 
agrees "to be bound by the terms of the Court Order which 
authorized the provision of notification . . . and. . . agree[s] 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court." Id. With respect 
to parents and other individuals in the community who 
receive the form for Tier 3 registrants, they similarly agree 
to: (1) "comply with the Order of the Court which allows me 
to receive the sex offender information"; (2)"comply with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
steps to protect those children and others under their supervision." App. 
at 109. For schools, the principal signs the receipt form and receives an 
Unredacted and a Redacted Notice. The principal can then share the 
Unredacted Notice with other personnel if he or she feels there is a 
particular need to do so and if that other individual also signs a receipt 
form. See id. at 113 (opining that "[t]he principal should share the 
notice 
with any person who in the course of the duties of his or her 
employment . . . is regularly in a position to observe unauthorized 
persons on or near the property of the notified school"). Alternatively, 
the 
principal can distribute the Redacted Notice without the need to have the 
receipt form signed. A similar procedure is set forth for community 
organizations beginning with a "designated official" signing the receipt 
form and receiving the Unredacted Notice. See  App. at 116-19. 
 
When a registrant is classified as a Tier 3 offender, in addition to those 
individuals who are notified pursuant to Tier 2, notification is made "to 
community members and businesses within the court-authorized 
notification zone and to the parents and guardians of children attending 
schools located within the area in which the court ordered notification to 
the community." Id. at 119. Notification is made by "law enforcement 
hand-delivering the Notice . . . to an adult member of each household 
and to a full-time adult supervisory employee or owner in every business 
located in the area in the scope of notification." Id. at 120. If no one 
is 
available to receive the notice, a copy of an Attempted Delivery Form is 
left, instructing the person to contact the local law enforcement agency 
or County Prosecutor's Office. See id. Additionally, a Redacted Notice can 
be sent to all parents and guardians of students attending a school 
located in the court-authorized notification zone via regular United 
States mail. See id. at 122. 
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the Megan's Law Rules of Conduct"; and (3) "submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Court." Id. at 155. 3 
 
Once the receipt form is signed, the individual receives 
the Unredacted Notice along with a copy of the court order 
and the "Rules of Conduct," which also vary somewhat 
depending on the recipient. See 145-48. With respect to 
school personnel, the Rules of Conduct state that the 
recipient cannot "share the information in this notification 
flier, or the flier itself, with anyone." Id. at 145.4 The Rules 
of Conduct for community organization recipients state that 
they are not allowed to share the information in the"flier, 
or the flier itself, with anyone outside of the community 
organization." Id. at 146. Finally, parents and legal 
guardians are told that they can share the information 
"with those residing in [their] household, such as family 
members," and "with anyone caring for [their] children at 
[their] residence in [their] absence." Id. at 147. They are not 
allowed, however, to share the information with anyone 
outside of the household or not in their care and, 
specifically, not "with the media." Id.  All of the Rules 
expressly warn that inappropriate conduct vis-a-vis the 
notices "may result in court action or prosecution being 
taken against you." Id. at 145-48. 
 
If an individual refuses to sign a receipt form, he or she 
is still permitted to receive a Redacted Notice. Someone 
receiving a Redacted Notice is also warned that he or she, 
along with household members, is "bound to comply with 
the Megan's Law Rules of Conduct." Id. at 121. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The court orders of ten of the twenty-one counties in New Jersey 
contained language warning that one who discloses sex offender 
information without authority to do so will be subject to penalties for 
contempt. On July 17, 2000, the state judges responsible for Megan's 
Law cases were advised that the Supreme Court of New Jersey did not 
approve the use of contempt of court language in court orders permitting 
notification and specifically instructed that such language not be 
included in those orders. See Letter from the Honorables David S. 
Baime, P.J.A.D., and Lawrence M. Lawson, A.J.S.C., to Megan's Law 
Judges, submitted under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j). 
 
4. The Rules of Conduct note that "[l]aw enforcement will notify all 
appropriate community members, schools, organizations, residences and 
business." See, e.g., App. at 145. 
 
                                12 
  
Upon receipt of the New Guidelines, appellants moved to 
enforce the injunction issued on January 24, 2000. This 
time, however, appellants only raised two challenges. First, 
they argued "that the revised Guidelines are deficient 
because they do not require the issuance of a court order 
which would make the recipient of sex offender information 
subject to contempt of court sanctions for subsequent 
unauthorized disclosures." Paul P. v. Farmer , 92 F. Supp. 
2d 410, 412 (D.N.J. 2000). Second, they argued "that a 
person's block of residence is constitutionally protected 
information which will be disseminated without any 
safeguards against its improper use in the `redacted' 
notices." Id. 
 
The District Court rejected both arguments. First, noting 
that the adequacy of safeguards "is a flexible determination 
to be made based upon the facts of the particular case and 
the goals of the particular statute," the District Court 
determined that "the Attorney General has devised a 
reasonable method of distributing sex offender information 
to authorized persons, while avoiding disclosure to 
unauthorized persons." Id. at 413-14. Second, the District 
Court held that "[i]nformation concerning the general area 
in which a person lives is not information of an extremely 
personal or private nature. Nor is this information generally 
within a person's `reasonable expectations of 
confidentiality.' " Id. at 415. Thus, the District Court 
concluded that the New Guidelines adequately protect any 
private information from unauthorized disclosure and 
vacated its injunction against disseminating Megan's Law 
notices.5 
 




All that remains at issue in this case, after more than 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. On April 18, 2000, we granted appellants' motion to stay the District 
Court's Order and, in doing so, reinstated the injunction which the 
District Court had stayed on January 24, 2000. On July 12, 2000, after 
hearing oral argument in this case, we vacated our stay, thus permitting 
the dissemination of notices to proceed under the New Guidelines. 
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three years of extensive litigation, is a single issue 
addressed to the Unredacted Notices and a single issue 
addressed to the Redacted Notices. Appellants initially 
argued, as to the Unredacted Notices, that the New 
Guidelines were inadequate as a matter of federal 
constitutional law because in ten counties the court orders 
which accompanied those notices did not contain contempt 
of court language and, thus, authorized individuals who 
received Megan's Law notices were not deterred from 
distributing the information to persons unauthorized to 
receive it. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey rejected the use of contempt language in any 
notification order, see supra note 3, and appellants now 
appear to be arguing that because there is no longer a 
sanction, contempt or otherwise, they are inadequately 
protected from unauthorized disclosures of an offender's 
home address. We do not agree. 
 
In Paul P. I, although we accepted appellants' claim "that 
there is some nontrivial interest in one's home address by 
persons who do not wish it disclosed," we made it clear that 
that interest must give way to the state's compelling 
interest in notifying the public "where prior sex offenders 
live so that susceptible individuals can be appropriately 
cautioned." 170 F.3d at 404; see also E.B. , 119 F.3d at 
1104 (opining "that the state's interest here would suffice to 
justify the deprivation even if a fundamental right of the 
registrant's were implicated" in Megan's Law notifications). 
In evaluating whether the New Guidelines provide adequate 
safeguards, we cannot ignore this compelling state interest. 
Indeed, it is this very interest which places this case in a 
different posture than other cases in which we have been 
called upon to evaluate whether the safeguards in place 
were adequate to protect the privacy interest at stake. 
 
In United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 
570 (3d Cir. 1980), and Fraternal Order of Police v. City of 
Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987), for example, the 
disclosure sought was extremely limited and the interest 
which justified even that limited disclosure was narrow. In 
Westinghouse, the National Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health ("NIOSH") sought Westinghouse's employees' 
medical records as part of its health hazard evaluation of 
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the Westinghouse plant. See 638 F.2d at 572. The 
information would not be shared with individuals outside of 
NIOSH, except perhaps outside contractors who were 
bound to nondisclosure by their contracts with NIOSH. See 
id. at 580. We recognized that NIOSH had an interest 
militating toward disclosure of the employees' private 
information, but only for this specific purpose. See id. at 
579. Because the procedures for safekeeping the 
information protected this limited disclosure, we concluded 
that there were adequate safeguards in place. See id. at 
580. 
 
In Fraternal Order of Police, the Philadelphia Police 
Department sought information about certain applicants' 
medical history, financial status, and gambling and 
drinking habits. We found that there was a strong public 
interest in seeing that the Department obtain this 
information as it was sought not only for the purpose of 
selecting officers who were physically and mentally capable 
of working in dangerous and highly stressful positions, but 
to combat corruption among officers assigned to units 
which performed investigations in areas traditionally 
susceptible to corruption. See id. 812 F.2d at 116. 
However, this interest, at most, only justified disclosure for 
the narrow purpose of the application process and only to 
those officials within the Department responsible for the 
application process. See id. at 118. Because there was a 
"complete absence" of procedures limiting access to the 
private information and specifying its handling and storage, 
we determined that there were no adequate safeguards 
against unnecessary disclosure to the public. See id. at 118 
(noting that "there is no statute or regulation that penalizes 
officials with confidential information from disclosing it"). 
 
In neither Westinghouse nor Fraternal Order of Police, 
therefore, was the articulated state interest or interests 
sufficient to justify public disclosure of the private 
information being collected. Consequently, there was a need 
for safeguards which adequately protected against 
unnecessary public disclosure. 
 
Megan's Law's fundamental purpose, however, is  public 
disclosure. The Law calls for the disclosure of sex offenders' 
information to numerous individuals in the general public 
 
                                15 
  
pursuant to the Attorney General's Guidelines and subject 
to the judicial review process provided by the New Jersey 
state courts. See supra note 2; see also Doe v. Poritz, 142 
N.J. 1, 30 (1997) (requiring "judicial review of the Tier 
classification and the manner of notification prior to actual 
notification"). For example, with a Tier 3 offender, every 
parent of a child attending a school within the court- 
authorized notification zone is entitled to receive an 
Unredacted Notice. Appellants do not, nor could they, 
contest the necessity for such disclosures. See Paul P. I, 
170 F.3d at 404, 406 (holding that appellants' privacy 
interest claim based on the disclosure of information to 
those who have a particular need for it must fail); see also 
Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 (1995) (addressing a challenge 
to the sex offender registration and notification laws and 
concluding that "the state interest in public disclosure 
substantially outweighs plaintiff's interest in privacy"). 
Moreover, within the Unredacted Notice, there is an 
abundance of information, e.g., name, date of birth, sex, 
and conviction, the disclosure of which does not implicate 
a privacy interest, and appellants do not argue that it does. 
See Paul P. I, 170 F.3d at 403. 
 
In light of these authorized public disclosures, all that 
remains is the potential that a minimal burden, albeit a 
real one, will be placed on appellants' nontrivial privacy 
interest if there are subsequent, unauthorized disclosures 
with respect to a single piece of information, an offender's 
home address. Wholly aside from the fact that appellants 
do not suggest that, with adequate safeguards, the 
inclusion of home addresses in the Unredacted Notices 
would be inappropriate, the New Guidelines reasonably 
attempt to avoid any burden on appellants' privacy rights 
by requiring for the Unredacted Notices stringent delivery 
and notification procedures. See supra at 10-12. Moreover, 
the notification order itself and the accompanying Rules of 
Conduct rigorously stress the confidentiality of the 
information being provided, comprehensively explain how 
the information can and cannot be used, and firmly warn 
against unauthorized disclosures. Consequently, we agree 
with the District Court that "the Attorney General has 
devised a reasonable method of distributing sex offender 
information to authorized persons, while avoiding 
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disclosure to unauthorized persons." Paul P. , 92 F. Supp. 
2d at 414. We further agree with the District Court that 
although contempt of court language may further reduce 
the number of unauthorized disclosures, a conclusion it 
reached even before the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
struck that language from the orders, the absence of 
such language does not render the New Guidelines 
unconstitutional. See id. 
 
We, therefore, reject appellants' initial argument that 
uniform contempt language is required in the court orders 
which accompany the Unredacted Notices and their later 
argument that without a sanction such as contempt the 
safeguards are inadequate.6 Stated in positive terms, we 
find that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, 
appellants' privacy interest is adequately protected. 
 
The single issue raised with respect to the Redacted 
Notices is this: the "governmental disclosure of one's street 
name, block of residence, and name of apartment building 
. . . breaks the veil of anonymity surrounding one's place of 
residence" and, thus, infringes upon appellants' privacy 
interest. Appellants Br. at 45. Again, we disagree. 
 
Whatever privacy interest, if any, may exist in the area of 
one's residence, i.e., street name, block of residence, or 
name of apartment building, however, is substantially 
outweighed by the state's compelling interest in disclosing 
Megan's Law information to the relevant public, an interest 
recognized in Paul P. I, 170 F.3d at 404. Redacted Notices, 
it must be remembered, are not released willy-nilly to the 
general public. Rather, they are generally given only to 
individuals within the court-authorized notification zone, 
individuals who are otherwise authorized to receive an 
Unredacted Notice, but who do not sign a receipt form. Any 
burden imposed on appellants as a result of the 
identification of a quite specific area of residence, albeit not 
the precise home address itself, simply does not trump the 
state's interest in providing that information to authorized 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We recognize that the New Guidelines have only recently gone into 
effect because, as explained above, we only recently vacated the stay 
earlier ordered by this Court. If the safeguards prove to be inadequate, 
we do not preclude an application to the District Court for relief. 
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individuals within the court-authorized notification zone. 
Hence, we reject appellants' contention that the use of 




We conclude that the New Guidelines adequately 
safeguard appellants' interest in assuring that information 
is disclosed only to those individuals who have a particular 
need for the information. Moreover, we find that including 
in the Redacted Notices information concerning appellants' 
area of residence does not unjustly infringe upon 
appellants' privacy interest. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
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